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Investor Reactions to Management Earnings Guidance Attributions: The Effects of News 
Valence, Attribution Locus, and Outcome Controllability 
 
Abstract 
We conduct two experiments to investigate how investors react to attributions accompanying 
management guidance. In our first experiment, we investigate the joint effect of attribution locus 
(external versus internal attribution) and guidance-news valence (positive versus negative 
guidance news) on investors’ earnings judgments. We find that investors provide lower earnings 
estimates when management attributes negative guidance news to external factors than internal 
factors. When the guidance news is positive, the locus (internal versus external) of the 
attributions has no effect on investors’ earnings estimates. In our second experiment, we separate 
out the effect of the attribution’s outcome controllability (controllable versus uncontrollable) 
from that of attribution locus in a negative guidance news setting. We find that investors provide 
higher earnings estimates for internal/outcome controllable attributions than for internal/outcome 
uncontrollable attributions. Outcome controllability does not matter when attributions are 
external. Our study extends prior research by showing how the valence of management guidance 
and the characteristics of guidance attributions jointly influence investors’ earnings judgments. 
 
Keywords: management earnings guidance, attribution, attribution locus, outcome 
controllability 
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Introduction 
Management earnings guidance (hereafter, management guidance) is the voluntary disclosure of 
earnings forecasts provided by managers. Managers have discretion over whether to provide 
causal attributions to accompany their guidance (hereafter, guidance attributions). Such 
attributions are part of management’s voluntary disclosures, and the usefulness and effects of 
voluntary disclosure in the communication with investors have been among the key concerns of 
practitioners (FASB, 2001). Prior studies suggest that guidance attributions are strategic in that 
attributions relating to factors external (internal) to the guidance-issuing firms are more likely to 
accompany negative (positive) guidance news (Baginski, Hassell, & Hillison, 2000; Baginski, 
Hassell, & Kimbrough, 2004). However, it remains unclear how investors’ judgments are 
interactively influenced by these external/internal attributions when they accompany guidance 
that provides positive/negative news (i.e., guidance that is higher/lower than the most recent 
consensus analyst forecast). For instance, Baginski et al. (2004) document that external 
attributions increase market reactions to unexpected earnings but internal attributions do not; 
however, they do not investigate the effect of attribution locus (i.e., internal or external 
attributions; Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw, Mckechnie, & Puffer, 1983) within each type of 
guidance news (positive versus negative). Hence, it is unknown whether the effect documented 
by Baginski et al. (2004) applies equally to both positive and negative news settings, or only to 
either a positive or negative news setting. This situation is further complicated by the fact that 
external/internal attributions are more likely to accompany negative/positive news (Baginski et 
al., 2000; Bettman & Weitz, 1983).   
Investigating whether investors’ judgments are jointly influenced by attribution locus and 
news valence is important because managers’ decisions on the nature of attributions to provide 
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(if any) are clearly strategic in that the characteristics of these attributions differ depending on 
whether the guidance news is positive or negative (Baginski et al., 2000). At the same time, the 
veracity of these attributions, generally classified as soft-talk disclosures,
 
is difficult to verify for 
outsiders (Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003).
1
 Presumably, by providing external/internal 
attributions for negative/positive news guidance, managers aim to temper investors’ negative 
reactions to bad news and strengthen investors’ positive reactions to good news. Should this 
happen, there would be welfare implications for investors, particularly when the attributions are 
untruthful. On the other hand, psychology theory suggests that investors discount or even react 
negatively to attributions that are consistent with management incentives, which suggests that 
management’s strategic intentions may not come to fruition (Carlston & Shovar, 1983; Forsyth, 
Berger, & Mitchell, 1981; Hirst, Koonce, & Simko, 1995; Hodge, Hopkins, & Pratt, 2006). 
Theory further suggests that the effect of attribution locus may be asymmetrical such that 
attribution locus may not matter for positive guidance as individuals’ attributional search is 
generally truncated for positive news (Wong & Weiner, 1981). An investigation of whether 
attribution locus interacts with news valence in influencing investor judgment is therefore 
necessary. We also test the mechanism underlying this effect. 
As a related issue, we examine how outcome controllability, defined as the extent to which 
managers are able to change or influence the outcome/consequence of their actions or events 
(Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn, & Kidder, 1982; Karasawa, 1991; Schwarzer & 
Weiner, 1991; Tan & Lipe, 1997), moderates the effect of attribution locus on investors’ 
judgments. Outcome controllability and its interaction with attribution locus are of interest 
                                                          
1
 Soft-talk disclosures are defined as costless, nonbinding and non-verifiable (Barton & Mercer, 2005; Farrell & 
Rabin, 1996; Hutton et al., 2003). Verifiability refers to whether the statement is specific enough to be compared 
with subsequent realizations (Hutton et al., 2003). 
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because attributions can contain, and vary in, both aspects. Information about the controllability 
of future events is useful to evaluate the performance of managers and improve the welfare of 
both the principal and the agent (Antle & Demski, 1988; Crant, 2000; Feltham & Xie, 1994; 
Holmstrom, 1979). Further, without additional information about outcome controllability, lay 
beliefs are that internal/external attributions are more/less controllable by managers (Bettman & 
Weitz, 1983), but conceptually, attribution locus and controllability are distinct constructs 
(Weiner, 1979, 1985). If investors believe that internal attributions are controllable and infer so 
when management merely discloses an internal attribution without any statement about its 
controllability, investors may be drawing inappropriate conclusions that could bias their 
subsequent judgments. In addition, if management discloses both locus and controllability of 
attributions, investors may choose to ignore one of the dimensions based on the belief that one 
dimension is redundant or irrelevant in the presence of the other. Previous accounting research 
on attribution focuses on one dimension of attribution in isolation, such as attribution locus 
(Baginski et al., 2000; Baginski et al., 2004; Elliott, Hodge, & Sedor, 2012) and controllability 
(Bol & Smith, 2011), and their joint effects remain unknown. Understanding the effects of these 
attribution dimensions in the management guidance setting is particularly important because 
managers have discretion in terms of how they frame an attribution.  
We conduct two experiments to address our research questions. Our use of an experimental 
method allows us to hold constant the quantitative aspects of management’s disclosure while 
varying only the qualitative disclosures, as well as to test the cognitive mechanism by which 
investors react to the attributions accompanying management guidance. It also enables an 
orthogonal partitioning of the attributions by attribution locus and outcome controllability, which 
would be more challenging to do using archival data. In particular, even though some 
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combinations (e.g., an external and outcome controllable attribution) may occur less frequently 
in practice, the use of an experimental methodology allows us to disentangle these variables and 
theoretically test the combinations of variables that are underrepresented in practice. In addition, 
we hold firm characteristics constant across conditions. This eliminates the self-selection issues 
that potentially arise from an archival investigation; for instance, Baginski et al. (2004) 
document that firm characteristics differ systematically between those with and without 
attributions and those providing external and internal attributions.  
We use a 2×2+2 between-subjects design in Experiment One with 119 Master of Finance 
students as participants. We hold constant the background information and the magnitude of 
management guidance news across conditions, and vary attribution locus (internal versus 
external) and the news valence of the management guidance (positive versus negative). We also 
add two control conditions in which no attribution is provided with the positive (negative) news 
guidance. Our results indicate that when management guidance news is negative, investors make 
lower earnings estimates when external attributions are provided than when internal attributions 
are provided. When management guidance news is positive, the locus of the attributions has no 
significant effect on investors’ judgments. We posit that managers making self-serving 
attributions (e.g., external attributions for negative news) are deemed less credible, and we find 
support for this premise in that perceived management credibility mediates the above effect for 
negative guidance news. In contrast, we find no support for Baginski et al.’s (2004) argument 
that disclosure verifiability is responsible for the effects of attribution locus. We also find that 
investors perceive internal attributions to be more controllable by management than external 
attributions.   
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We conduct a 2×2 between-subjects Experiment Two with Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) participants to separate out the effects of attribution locus and outcome controllability. 
We manipulate attribution locus (internal versus external) and outcome controllability 
(controllable versus uncontrollable outcomes) when guidance news is negative. Results from 
Experiment Two show that, investors’ earnings estimates are higher when an attribution is 
internal and outcome controllable than when it is internal and outcome uncontrollable. There is 
no effect of outcome controllability when the attribution is external. We also show that when an 
internal attribution is provided, outcome controllability enhances perceived management 
credibility and improves the perceived future prospects of the company, which in turn influence 
investors' earnings judgments. The findings of Experiment Two suggest that the two dimensions 
of attributions, locus and outcome controllability, interact in influencing investors’ earnings 
judgments such that internal attributions accompanying the negative guidance have a positive 
effect on investors’ estimates only when they are viewed as outcome controllable.   
Our paper contributes to the literature on soft-talk disclosures in the following respects. First, 
our Experiment One contributes to this literature by testing the joint effect of guidance news 
valence and attribution locus. Prior literature has considered the two variables separately. For 
example, Hutton et al. (2003) investigate investors’ reactions to soft-talk disclosures 
accompanying management guidance. They document that soft-talk disclosures do not enhance 
the credibility of either positive or negative guidance. They do not examine whether this effect 
varies with internal/external attributions. Baginski et al.  (2004) classify attributions into internal 
and external ones and examine the stock price reactions to them. They find that investors’ 
reactions to management guidance are magnified with external attributions, but not with internal 
attributions. These authors argue that this finding may be explained by the greater verifiability 
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associated with external attributions. Baginski et al. (2004) do not investigate the interaction 
between attribution locus and guidance news valence. By jointly considering the two factors, our 
results reveal a more complete picture of how investors react to attribution locus (internal versus 
external) contained in management guidance that varies by news valence (positive versus 
negative guidance). Our results are partially consistent with those of Hutton et al. (2003) in the 
sense that attributions have no effect for positive earnings guidance. However, we additionally 
show that providing external attributions leads to more negative investors’ reactions than 
providing internal attributions for negative guidance. Our results identify an important boundary 
condition to the results in Baginski et al. (2004): the effect of attribution locus is more likely to 
occur for negative guidance than for positive guidance. Furthermore, we identify perceived 
management credibility as the mechanism through which attribution locus has an effect on 
investors’ judgments, and we find little support for the verifiability explanation. 
Second, we contribute to the attribution literature, both in accounting and psychology, by 
showing that different dimensions of attributions interact in shaping investor judgments. We 
offer the first piece of evidence on the joint effect of these distinct attribution dimensions (here, 
attribution locus and outcome controllability) on investors’ judgments. Our results imply that 
investors do not react only to the attribution locus, but that for the same internal attribution, their 
reactions differ depending on whether the attribution is controllable by management. Further, 
while prior studies show that outcome controllability can influence decision makers’ evaluations 
(Bol & Smith, 2011; Tan & Lipe, 1997), we contribute to this literature by showing that the 
effect of outcome controllability is conditional on attribution locus. These findings are 
informative to managers who wish to understand the potential effects of their disclosure choices.  
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In the next section, we develop our first set of hypotheses and describe the design and results 
of Experiment One. We then develop our second set of hypotheses and describe the design and 
results of Experiment Two. We conclude the paper in the final section. 
Experiment one: Joint effect of attribution locus and guidance news valence 
Literature review and hypothesis development 
Management voluntarily discloses certain information, such as revenue and cash flow 
guidance and explanations, along with its earnings guidance. Such additional disclosures have 
incremental effects on investors’ reactions to management guidance (Baginski et al., 2000; 
Baginski et al., 2004; Cao, Wasley, & Wu, 2007; Han & Wild, 1991; Hirst, Koonce, & 
Venkataraman, 2007; Hutton et al., 2003). Attributions accompanying management guidance are 
classified as soft-talk (or cheap-talk) disclosures in the sense that those explanatory discussions 
are difficult to verify both ex ante and ex post (Hutton et al., 2003).  
Some studies examine investors’ (or market) reactions to the supplementary disclosures 
accompanying management guidance. Hutton et al. (2003) find that negative guidance is credible 
with or without soft-talk disclosures, while positive guidance is credible only when accompanied 
by verifiable forward-looking statements. Thus, their results suggest that soft-talk disclosures 
that are hard to verify do not enhance credibility for either positive or negative guidance. 
Qualitative attributions constitute one kind of soft-talk disclosures in their study. Baginski et al. 
(2004) classify the accompanying attributions with management guidance into external and 
internal attributions and find that the stock market reacts more strongly to the unexpected 
earnings in guidance, especially when an external attribution is provided with management 
guidance. They argue that this effect occurs because external attributions are more verifiable than 
internal attributions, which increases the precision and credibility of the unexpected earnings 
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signal. Baginski et al. (2004) include ranked unexpected earnings as a control variable in their 
regression models, and report that attributions magnify market reactions to both positive and 
negative news. They do not investigate the effect of attribution locus within each type of 
guidance news (positive versus negative). Thus, prior literature documents the main effect of 
either news valence (positive/negative; Hutton et al., 2003) or attribution locus (internal/external; 
Baginski et al., 2004) separately, but not the possible interaction effect between the two factors.  
Some studies separately examine the effect of attribution locus on investors’ reactions to 
past performance of the company, especially when the performance is poor. Elliott et al. (2012) 
find that when an earnings restatement (i.e., negative news) is announced using an online video 
(versus via text), investors’ negative/positive reactions to the CEO’s denial/acceptance of 
responsibility by making an external/internal attribution for restatements are magnified. 
Interestingly, contrary to findings in psychology (Carlston & Shovar, 1983; Forsyth et al., 1981) 
and organizational behavior (Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens, 2004; Lee & Tiedens, 2001), their 
findings indicate that the effect of attribution locus is insignificant in a text mode (p = 0.56 and 
0.65 for the trust factor and investment recommendations, see Tables 2 and 3, Elliott et al., 2012), 
perhaps because the severity of an earnings restatement overwhelms any effect of attribution 
locus. Like Baginski et al. (2004), Elliott et al. (2012) do not examine whether the effect of 
attribution locus is contingent on news valence. Barton and Mercer (2005) focus on the 
plausibility of explanations for poor company performance, and find that compared with the no-
attribution control group, a plausible/implausible external attribution for poor performance 
reported in the annual report leads to lower/higher analysts’ perceived persistence of poor 
performance and higher/lower earnings forecasts. Barton and Mercer (2005) examine a main 
effect of attribution plausibility in a setting of external attributions provided with negative 
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earnings performance. However, they do not compare internal versus external attributions in 
either a negative or a positive earnings news setting.   
In this paper, we examine whether the effect of internal/external attributions on investors’ 
judgments varies between positive and negative news in a management guidance context. In this 
setting, both guidance and its accompanying attributions are management’ voluntary disclosures. 
Investors are likely to cast doubt on the credibility of the disclosure since managers have 
discretion over the provision and the type of guidance and attributions. Further, guided earnings 
are not realized yet and there is a greater degree of outcome uncertainty in the guidance setting 
(than the actual earnings announcement setting or the earnings restatement setting). Hence, 
attributions accompanying management guidance are particularly important because they 
directly inform investors on the likelihood that the guidance on future earnings can be met 
(Koonce, Seybert, & Smith, 2011).
2
  
Baginski et al. (2000) find that managers have a proclivity to issue self-serving attributions 
in that external/internal attributions tend to accompany negative/positive news relating to 
management guidance. Psychology research suggests that managers do so to protect their self-
esteem or manage investors’ impressions (Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979). Presumably, such 
attribution patterns can reduce/magnify investors’ negative/positive reactions to the 
negative/positive guidance. However, there is no empirical evidence on whether investors’ 
reactions are indeed differentially impacted by the various types of attributions accompanying 
negative/positive guidance. 
Consider a case where managers provide external (as opposed to internal) attributions with 
negative guidance. From the managers’ perspective, their presumed intention is to mitigate 
                                                          
2
 In contrast, the attributions accompanying actual earnings announcement inform investors about causes for past 
performance but not necessarily that of future performance. 
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investors’ adverse reaction to the negative guidance by shifting the responsibility to an external 
factor. However, this assumes that investors accept their attributions at face value. Several 
factors suggest otherwise, and that a reaction counter to managers’ presumed intended reaction 
likely occurs. Prior psychology studies find that people make inferences about the self-serving 
nature in others’ behavior, and evaluate others who make self-serving attributions less favorably 
in terms of their credibility than those who make non-self-serving attributions (Carlston & 
Shovar, 1983; Forsyth et al., 1981; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004). Given the presence of an 
attribution accompanying guidance, investors’ reactions to the attribution accompanying 
negative guidance are conditional on their prior expectations about management’s attributing 
patterns (i.e., managers’ choice of the type of attributions provided) (Clor-Proell, 2009; Hirst et 
al., 1995; Hodge et al., 2006). Prior accounting research indicates that investors are aware of the 
self-serving incentives of managers’ disclosures (Lang & Lundholm, 2000; Skinner, 1994; 
Williams, 1996) and accounting choices (Clor-Proell, 2009; Hodge et al., 2006), as well as those 
of investment banking analysts (Hirst et al., 1995). Hence, to the extent that investors are 
cognizant of managers’ incentives to blame external factors for negative guidance, they likely 
perceive managers to be less credible when managers provide external attributions than internal 
attributions for negative guidance.  
Overall, we expect that when external (as opposed to internal) attributions are provided with 
negative management guidance, managers will be viewed as less credible, which in turn induces 
investors to believe that these managers are more likely to intentionally misguide the market. 
This leads investors to react negatively to the attributions, and to perceive that the associated 
future earnings are worse than disclosed since management has acted strategically in attributing 
the causes. The opposite is predicted when an internal attribution accompanies negative guidance: 
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managers are viewed as more credible, the perceived likelihood that managers are intentionally 
misguiding the market is lower, and earnings are less likely to be worse than disclosed.
 
This 
suggests that investors’ earnings estimates will be lower in response to external attributions than 
internal attributions accompanying negative guidance. 
H1a. For negative management guidance, investors’ earnings estimates are lower when an 
external attribution is provided than when an internal attribution is provided. 
The effect of attribution locus in the positive guidance context is less clear. On the one hand, 
following the arguments above, for positive guidance, investors may perceive managers to be 
less credible and earnings to be worse than expected when they provide an internal attribution 
(because it is self-serving and consistent with managers’ incentives); in contrast, they may 
perceive managers to be more credible and earnings to be better than expected when an external 
attribution is provided.  
On the other hand, attributions may not matter for positive management guidance. 
Accounting studies document that positive management guidance is discounted because 
investors understand management’s incentives to issue positive earnings news to enhance stock 
prices (Lang & Lundholm, 2000; Skinner, 1994; Williams, 1996).
3
 In terms of attributions, 
psychology research finds that a good and expected outcome is less likely to instigate 
attributional search than a bad and unexpected outcome (Wong & Weiner, 1981). If positive 
guidance is discounted to begin with and attributional search is less likely to be made in such 
instances, the accompanying attributions are less likely to matter, whether they are internal or 
external.
4
  
                                                          
3
 Investors react to positive management guidance only when there is some assurance of its credibility (Hutton et al., 
2003) or when they are motivated to do so (Han & Tan, 2010). 
4
 Hutton et al. (2003) propose that investors tend to search for more verifiable information when management 
guidance is less credible. However, attributions are “soft-talk” disclosures that are not easily verifiable, and 
therefore investors may not attend to them even for less-credible positive guidance. 
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Overall, this discussion suggests that unlike a negative guidance context, the effects of 
attributions in a positive guidance context may be weak. We formally state our hypothesis as 
below.
 
 
H1b. The effect of attribution locus on investors’ earnings estimates will be weaker for positive 
guidance than for negative guidance. 
 
 
Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the predicted pattern of Hypothesis 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Design  
Experiment One has a 2×2+2 between-subjects design, with the two independent variables 
being attribution locus (internal versus external) and guidance news valence (positive versus 
negative). We also include two control conditions, in which no attribution is provided with the 
(positive or negative) guidance. We hold constant the background information about the 
company and the magnitude of guidance news across conditions. One feature of the experimental 
design is that we tell participants the earnings guidance is caused by both the company’s 
marketing strategy (an internal factor) and the company’s main competitor’s marketing strategy 
(an external factor), and vary the extent to which the guidance news is attributable to the internal 
or external factor. By using such a duopoly scenario, we ensure that participants in the internal 
and external attribution conditions receive the same amount of information (i.e., both the 
company’s and the competitor’s marketing strategy) and the only difference is the locus of the 
attribution.
5
 Our main dependent variables are investors’ quarterly and annual earnings estimates, 
                                                          
5
 This design choice may bias against any findings for the attribution effect since the presence of both the company’s 
and the competitor’s marketing strategy in an attribution may reduce the salience of each individual factor. An 
alternative design would have been to provide a single attribution to participants, for example, foreign exchange 
fluctuation (cost cuttings) for the external (internal) conditions, such that participants view a different factor in the 
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which reflect investors’ forecasts of earnings for relatively shorter and longer horizons, 
respectively. 
Participants  
We recruited 119 Master of Finance students in a major Hong Kong university as proxies for 
non-professional investors (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, & Pronk, 2007; Han & Tan, 2010).
 
Their 
mean work experience was 5.60 years, and 91.34 percent had invested in the stock market. On 
average, they had taken 2.06 (5.60) accounting (finance) courses.  
Procedure  
Participants first read the background and financial information about a company called 
Theta Inc. (Theta) in the semiconductor industry. The information contained the description of 
the company’s business and a five-year financial summary and quarterly financial data up to the 
second quarter of the current year. Moreover, participants received analysts’ consensus forecast 
for the company’s earnings per share, which were $0.20 for the third quarter and $0.80 for the 
full year. 
After reviewing the background information, participants then proceeded to open Envelope 
A. Envelope A contained a management guidance press release issued by Theta. We held 
constant the magnitude of the management guidance news as 3 cents higher or lower than the 
analysts’ consensus forecast. In the “Positive/Negative News” condition, participants read a 
disclosure stating that the company expects earnings per share for the third quarter to be 
approximately $0.23/$0.17. In both the “Internal Attribution” and the “External Attribution” 
conditions, the explanation given made reference to both the company’s and the main 
competitor’s marketing strategies. In the “Internal Attribution” and “Positive/Negative News” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
external versus internal condition. In that case, it would be difficult to conclude whether the results are caused by the 
persistence, globality, or any inherent differences in the two factors.  
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conditions, the company stated that “(t)his is largely attributable to our new marketing strategy, 
although a poorly/well-received marketing drive of our main competitor played a minor role.” In 
contrast, in the “External Attribution” and “Positive/Negative News” conditions, the company 
stated that “(t)his is largely attributable to a poorly/well-received marketing drive of our main 
competitor, although our new marketing strategy played a minor role.” For the no attribution 
conditions, no explanation was provided with the management guidance, and these conditions 
served as control groups.  
After reading the management guidance, participants were asked to provide their earnings 
and investment-related judgments. In addition, they also provided assessments about their 
willingness to rely on future earnings guidance provided by Theta, management competence, and 
management trustworthiness on 11-point scales (with 0 indicating extremely low and 10 
indicating extremely high), as well as the likelihood that the manager was intentionally 
misguiding the market on an 11-point scale (with -5 indicating extremely unlikely and 5 
indicating extremely likely). After that, participants were asked to answer some demographic 
questions. Participants then proceeded to open Envelope B, which included manipulation check 
questions and a within-subjects test.   
Manipulation checks  
As a check on news valence manipulation, we asked the participants whether Theta’s 
management guidance was below, equal to, or above the analysts’ consensus forecasts. In the 
negative (positive) guidance condition, 66.7 (79.0) percent of participants correctly indicate that 
Theta’s management guidance was below (above) the analysts’ consensus forecasts. A chi-
square test of independence confirms that manipulation check failures are not associated with the 
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guidance news manipulation (Pearson χ2 = 2.31, df = 1, p = 0.13).6 To check our manipulation of 
attribution locus, we asked the participants to assess whether the explanation provided by 
management is caused by conditions internal or external to the company (on an 11-point scale 
with -5 indicating internal factor; 0 indicating neutral; and 5 indicating external factor). The 
results suggest that our internal attributions are indeed perceived as more internal (mean = -1.08) 
than our external attributions (mean = 2.78; F = 60.61, one-tailed p < 0.01). Ratings do not vary 
by news valence or the interaction term (F = 0.11 and 1.09; p = 0.75 and 0.30; respectively). 
Results are unaffected by including or excluding those participants who failed the manipulation 
test for guidance news. Therefore, in the following sessions, we report the results based on all 
participants.
 
 
Results  
Tests of hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict that investors’ earnings estimates are lower for the external 
attribution condition than for the internal attribution condition when guidance news is negative, 
and that the effect of attributions locus is weaker when guidance news is positive. H1a and H1b 
jointly suggest a significant interaction effect between news valence and attribution locus. 
ANOVA results for third-quarter earnings estimates shown in Panel B, Table 1 indicate a 
significant main effect of news valence (F = 81.58, p < 0.01), an insignificant main effect of 
attribution (F = 2.04, p = 0.16), and a significant two-way interaction effect (F = 7.40, one-tailed 
equivalent p = 0.01).
 7
 Additional tests indicate that for negative guidance, consistent with H1a, 
                                                          
6
 All reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise stated. 
7
 We also conduct planned contrast tests to test H1a and H1b. The assigned contrast coefficients are -1 (for negative 
news and internal attribution condition), -3 (for negative news and external attribution condition), 2 (for positive 
news and internal attribution condition) and 2 (for positive news and external attribution condition). These contrast 
weights include a main effect of guidance news valence and also a specific interaction pattern of attribution locus 
and news valence as predicted in H1a and H1b. Results are significant for investors’ Q3 earnings estimates (F = 
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the mean estimates for the external attribution condition (0.172) are lower than those for the 
internal attribution condition (0.189) (F = 8.39, one-tailed p = 0.01; Table 1, Panel C). In 
addition, consistent with H1b, the simple main effect of attribution is insignificant for positive 
guidance (F = 0.86, p = 0.36; Table 1, Panel C).
8
 Results are similar when we use the full-year 
earnings estimates as the dependent variable (see Panels D and E, Table 1).
9
 
In addition, when guidance is negative, the mean earnings estimates for the external 
attribution condition are marginally lower than those for the no attribution condition (mean = 
0.181, one-tailed p = 0.07).  The mean estimates for the internal attribution condition are 
marginally higher than those for the no attribution condition (one-tailed p = 0.09). In contrast, 
when the guidance is positive, the mean earnings estimates in the no attribution control condition 
(mean = 0.212) are not significantly different from those in the internal attribution condition (p = 
0.20) or those in the external attribution condition (p = 0.74).
10,11
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
88.83, p < 0.01) and for full-year earnings estimates (F = 7.92, p < 0.01). We test the alternative weights (1/-3/1/1) 
and the contrast is also significant (F = 55.99/5.52, p < 0.01/=0.02 for Q3/full-year earnings estimates). 
8
 Investors’ third-quarter earnings estimates are positively associated with investors’ stock price appreciation 
evaluations (one-tailed p < 0.01). However, we find no such association with P/E ratio evaluations (smallest p = 
0.17), consistent with findings in prior studies (e.g., Han & Tan, 2010). One reason is that the association between 
earnings estimates and P/E ratio is ambiguous, in that a high P/E ratio can be associated with either positive or 
negative firm performance. 
9
 Four participants provided estimates that are literally identical for the third-quarter and full-year estimates ($0.20 
for both estimates in the case of one participant, and $0.23/$0.20, $0.19/$0.25, and $0.18/$0.30 for third-quarter 
/full-year estimates in the other three cases. We surmise that they likely misinterpreted the full-year earnings 
question (since the first-quarter and second-quarter earnings were $0.21 and $0.18, and the lowest prior full-year 
earnings were $0.52) and dropped these four observations from our analysis of full-year earnings estimates. 
10
 We also conduct a within-subjects test in which we presented participants with three scenarios where management 
provides either no, internal, or external attributions. The within-subjects results replicate our main results for 
negative guidance in that providing internal attributions leads to more positive reactions than providing external 
attributions. Interestingly, we find similar results for positive guidance in the within-subjects test, even though our 
between-subjects results indicate no effect of attribution locus. The discrepancy between the within-subject test and 
between-subjects test findings may be due to participants’ conscious awareness of different attribution locus in a 
within-subjects setting but not so in a between-subjects setting (e.g., Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002). 
11
 At the end of Experiment One, the participants were asked to indicate, for the positive (negative) news release, the 
number of companies, in general, out of 100 listed companies, whose management would take credit (take 
responsibility) for the news. Results indicate that investors believe that 76.48% (23.52%) of managers will (will not) 
take credit for positive guidance (t = 14.66, one–tailed p < 0.01), while they believe that 33.29% (66.71%) of 
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Insert Table 1 here 
Test of mechanisms 
We conduct additional analysis to test the underlying mechanism that news valence and 
attribution locus affect investors’ judgments. As we explained in our hypothesis development, 
we expect that the effect of news valence and attribution locus is through the impact on 
management credibility, which is measured by participants’ assessments of management 
trustworthiness.
12
 Consistent with our argument in developing the hypotheses, for negative 
guidance, managers providing internal attributions are perceived to be more credible (mean = 
5.40) than those providing external attributions (mean = 4.47; t = 1.90, one-tailed p = 0.03). In 
contrast, for positive guidance, there is no significant effect of attribution locus on management 
credibility (mean = 5.19/5.60 for external/internal attribution, t = 0.86, p = 0.39).  
We use structural equations modeling to test the overall model. The conventional χ2 test (χ2 
= 20.78, df = 15, p = 0.14) and a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) of 0.07 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996) confirm the model’s goodness of fit. As shown in 
Figure 2, for negative guidance, an internal attribution has a significantly positive impact on 
perceived management credibility (coefficient = 0.46, one-tailed p = 0.03). For positive guidance, 
the effect of locus on management credibility is insignificant (coefficient = 0.21, p = 0.38). 
Perceived management credibility is positively associated with a reverse-coded measure of 
perceived misguiding of the guidance (coefficient = 0.86, one-tailed p<0.01), which in turn has a 
positive effect on investors’ full-year earnings estimates (coefficient = 0.01, one-tailed p = 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
managers will (will not) take responsibility for negative guidance (t = -7.98, one–tailed p < 0.01). These results 
suggest that investors take into account managers’ self-serving tendency to some extent. 
12
 The joint effect of attribution locus and news valence on management competence is less clear. Consistent with 
prior research (e.g., Carlston & Shovar, 1983), we find that perceived management competence is affected by news 
valence (p = 0.01) but not attribution locus (main and interaction effects are insignificant; p = 0.15 and 0.89 
respectively). 
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0.01).
13
 Management credibility is also positively associated with participants’ willingness to 
rely on future guidance provided by the management (coefficient = 0.22, one-tailed p = 0.03). 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Additional analyses 
In the post-experimental questionnaire of Experiment One, in addition to the question about 
perceived attribution locus, participants were asked to rate management’s attributions on other 
dimensions; including whether they are: 1) caused by conditions under the control of the 
management; 2) verifiable; 3) stable over time; and 4) applied to every company in the industry. 
Participants’ perceived attribution locus is significantly positively correlated with perceived 
controllability (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.32, p < 0.01) but not correlated with perceived 
verifiability (p = 0.89), stability (p = 0.31), or globality (p = 0.10). None of these ratings varies 
among conditions (smallest p = 0.20), with the exception that internal attributions are viewed as 
more controllable (mean = 0.49) than external attributions (mean = -1.43; F = 11.31, p <0.01).
14
  
Baginski et al. (2004) posit that because external attributions are more verifiable than 
internal attributions, only external attributions are informative to the market. However, 
verifiability cannot explain our findings. First, perceived verifiability is not influenced by the 
manipulation or the perception of attribution locus. When we add perceived verifiability as a 
covariate to our main analysis, it is insignificant (F = 0.78, p = 0.38). Second, if the verifiability 
mechanism had worked, in the positive news condition, investors should have provided higher 
earnings estimates in the external condition than in the internal attribution conditions since the 
                                                          
13
 When we replace full-year earnings estimates with quarterly earnings estimates, the coefficient is 0.001 and 
marginally significant (one-tailed p = 0.08). 
14
 The main effect of news valence and interaction effect are all insignificant for perceived controllability (p = 0.38 
and 0.36 respectively). 
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former is more verifiable. In other words, we would not find an interaction effect of guidance 
news and locus of attribution.  
In the absence of additional information about other attribution dimensions, we find that 
internal attributions are viewed as more controllable than external attributions. We perform 
analyses to rule out controllability as a confounding effect. We conduct ANCOVA for quarterly 
earnings estimates with attribution locus and guidance news as independent variables and 
perceived controllability as a covariate. We find that the relationship between perceived 
controllability and earnings estimates is insignificant (p = 0.81), while the locus and guidance 
news interaction remains significant (p = 0.02) as in our main analysis. In addition, we median-
split perceived controllability into two groups and use this dummy variable to replace attribution 
locus as an independent variable in a two-way ANOVA to test its impact on earnings estimates. 
We find that the main effect of news valence is significant (F = 80.96, p < 0.01), while neither 
the main effect of controllability nor the two-way interaction effect is insignificant (F = 0.00 and 
2.33, p = 0.98 and 0.13, respectively). When guidance news is positive, the effect of 
controllability is insignificant (F = 1.17, p = 0.29). When guidance is negative, the effect of 
controllability is also insignificant (F = 1.16, p = 0.29). This provides some assurance that 
perceived controllability cannot fully explain our results in Experiment One. 
Experiment two: Joint effect of attribution locus and outcome controllability 
In Experiment One, we focused on a single dimension of attribution (i.e., attribution locus), 
and examined the interaction effect of attribution locus and the valence of guidance news. 
However, psychology research indicates that attributions have multi-dimensional 
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characteristics,
15
 of which outcome controllability is one important dimension (Antle & Demski, 
1988; Crant, 2000; Feltham & Xie, 1994; Holmstrom, 1979). Further, as our additional analysis 
in Experiment One shows, participants perceive that management has greater controllability for 
an internal attribution. This is consistent with research in psychology which documents that 
without additional information about controllability, decision makers make inferences about 
other dimensions based on a single dimension of attribution (Bettman & Weitz, 1983). As we 
discuss below, outcome controllability and locus are conceptually different constructs and have 
different effects on investors’ judgments. From a practical perspective, it is also important to 
distinguish the two constructs. For instance, if management discloses only the locus dimension in 
their attributions, participants may make inferences about the controllability aspect as well, and 
these inferences may not be consistent with what managers intend to communicate. In fact, as we 
discuss below, investors’ judgments in response to attribution locus differ depending on the 
absence or presence of outcome controllability. We examine this issue in Experiment Two, 
where we manipulate locus and outcome controllability of attributions to examine how these two 
different dimensions of attributions interact to influence investors’ judgments. 
Our focus in Experiment Two is on the controllability dimension, or more specifically, 
outcome controllability. Outcome controllability refers to the degree to which the person or the 
organization has control over the outcome of particular actions or events (Tan & Lipe, 1997). 
The cause of an expected earnings change can be internal or external to the company, but its 
outcome may be controllable or uncontrollable. As an example, if the cause for an anticipated 
                                                          
15
 For instance, Weiner (1979, 1985) classifies attribution along three dimensions: attribution locus, stability and 
controllability. Stability of an attribution relates to whether the cause persists over time. Controllability refers to the 
extent that the individual or organization holds the power to change or influence the outcome. Another dimension of 
attribution identified in the other studies is globality, which refers to whether the attribution itself is limited to 
particular situations or pervasive to many (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982). 
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earnings boost is the intended acquisition of a target company (classified as an internal 
attribution in Baginski et al., 2004), whether the acquisition is successful and provides synergies 
to the acquiring company depends to a certain extent on uncontrollable factors such as the 
target’s reactions and regulators’ approval. Similarly, a cause can be external to the company but 
its outcome is controllable if managers are able to identify and adapt to changes in the external 
cause. For example, a projected earnings drop can be due to an anticipated rising trend in interest 
rates, an external factor. However, management may be able to control the effect of such an 
external shock by engaging in interest rate swaps or by borrowing at fixed rates. Another 
example is an unfavorable change in market trends for a company’s product, which is an external 
cause. Managers may be able to counteract this threat and control its effect by tailoring the 
existing product to new trends, adjusting production mix, or shifting to a new target market.
16
  
Prior studies show that with respect to a past outcome, evaluators are more lenient in their 
evaluations of managers with regard to unfavorable outcomes when there is evidence that 
uncontrollable factors are at play (Tan & Lipe, 1997). Our focus here is on a future event where 
the outcome is yet to be finalized and managers can exert some influence. Of relevance are 
psychology studies that document a positive effect of outcome controllability on the perceived 
favorability of future prospects: when a target person has greater control over the solution of the 
problem and actively copes with the problem, people assign less blame, offer more help and 
                                                          
16
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms provide discussions about outcome controllability together with their 
internal or external attributions. For example, Performance Food Group reiterated its negative earnings guidance for 
the third and fourth quarters of 2004 and attributed it to higher self-insurance costs (i.e., an external cause according 
to the classification scheme used in Baginski et al., 2004) but highlights that “(t)he higher insurance costs, we're 
working diligently in our claims area. We've gotten a new actuary to look at our costs and what's been in this self-
insurance program, what we've got accrued to it,…So, we do think we've got that under control, although it has 
impacted us this year, and increasing insurance costs continue to impact us. We will do everything we can to get 
that under control” (i.e., outcome controllable). As another example, Hertz Global Holdings Inc. attributes its lower 
guided earnings for 2016 in part to the absence of any price increase (i.e., an internal cause) and comments “… I 
think our view is we can't control pricing per se” (i.e., outcome uncontrollable). 
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support, and attribute a higher chance of improvement because they expect the target person to 
act to change the current negative consequence (Karasawa, 1991; Schwarzer & Weiner, 1991). 
This suggests that for negative guidance (that relates to a future event), investors likely believe 
that higher/lower outcome controllability implies a higher/lower likelihood of success of 
management in mitigating the negative factor, and therefore more/less favorable future earnings 
prospects.  
Outcome controllability is also expected to influence management credibility. Managers 
may provide outcome controllable attributions to boost their credibility by signaling their ability 
to mitigate the negative earnings outcome. Alternatively, they may provide an outcome 
uncontrollable attribution to distance themselves from the negative earnings outcome, although 
this action can actually lower their credibility. Prior psychology studies suggest that people with 
high-status roles (such as managers) are expected by others to wield power and exercise control 
over critical resources (Lee et al., 2004; Lee & Robinson, 2000; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Singh, 
1994). Therefore, providing a controllable attribution is in line with outsiders’ expectations and 
will be perceived as more credible. In contrast, when managers assert that they have lower 
controllability over earnings outcomes, investors will perceive them to be less credible since it 
violates their expectations. In sum, we expect that outcome controllable attributions will lead to 
higher earnings estimates by investors than outcome uncontrollable attributions because they are 
associated with favorable future earnings prospects and perceived to be more credible. 
We predict that this effect of outcome controllability is contingent on whether the attribution 
is internal or external. We focus on negative guidance because, as explained in the previous 
section, the effect of attribution locus is likely more obvious for negative guidance than for 
positive guidance. As we posited earlier, for negative guidance, internal attributions are more 
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credible because it is not self-serving and counter to management’s incentives to do so. To the 
extent that investors find the internal attribution for negative guidance credible, they will then 
assess whether managers can take control of the situation and take actions to mitigate the factor 
causing the negative earnings guidance. Hence, we predict that investors will forecast higher 
earnings when the attribution is internal and outcome controllable than when the attribution is 
internal and outcome uncontrollable. In contrast, investors likely associate an external attribution 
with less credibility because it is self-serving and in line with management’s incentives. 
Accordingly, investors will more likely discount and react negatively to the external attribution, 
along with the accompanying disclosure about management’s controllability with respect to the 
external attribution. Thus, outcome controllability is less likely to matter for an external 
attribution with negative guidance. In summary, we expect an ordinal interaction of outcome 
controllability and attribution locus such that outcome controllability has a positive effect on 
investors’ earnings estimates, and this effect is stronger/weaker for internal/external attributions 
(see Panel A, Figure 3). We state our hypotheses as follows: 
H2a. Given negative management guidance, investors’ earnings estimates are higher when 
management discloses that the outcome of an internal attribution is controllable as opposed to 
uncontrollable. 
H2b. Given negative management guidance, the positive effect of outcome controllability on 
investors’ earnings estimates is likely to be weaker when the attribution is external than when it 
is internal. 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
 
Design for experiment two 
Experiment Two employs a 2×2 between-subjects design, with two independent variables 
being attribution locus (internal versus external) and attribution outcome controllability (outcome 
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controllable versus outcome uncontrollable). The management guidance news was negative in all 
conditions. 
Participants for experiment two 
In Experiment Two, we recruited 202 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This 
participant pool has been documented to be a suitable proxy for a non-professional investor pool 
(Farrell, Grenier, & Leiby, 2016; Koonce, Miller, & Winchel, 2015; Rennekamp, 2012; 
Rennekamp, Rupar, & Seybert, 2015). The use of these participants also allows us to generalize 
from Asian Masters students to a more general American pool. We required participants to be 
native English speakers who have an average approval rate of at least 95%. Each participant was 
paid US$1 for his/her time and effort. On average, participants took 6.11 minutes to complete the 
task, implying an effective hourly wage of $9.82 per hour. About 66.8% of participants were 
male and 59.9% of participants were between 18 and 30 years. Participants had an average of 
11.25 years of working experience and had taken an average of 1.15/1.08 accounting/finance 
courses. Overall, 46% of the participants indicated that they have some investment experience.  
Procedure for experiment two 
The materials (including brief background information, earnings history, an earnings 
announcement for the company’s first two quarters in the fiscal year, and consensus analyst 
forecasts) of Experiment Two were largely similar to those for Experiment One except for minor 
changes made in order to shorten the case.
 17
 We use a negative management guidance news 
context in all conditions (i.e., as in Experiment One, guided earnings are $0.17, which is 3 cents 
lower than the analysts’ consensus EPS forecast of $0.20). All participants first read that the 
company’s earnings per share were estimated to be “below market expectations” for the coming 
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 In Experiment Two, we made some revisions to the questions following the results in Experiment One. For 
example, we replaced the stock appreciation question with one on valuation, and used scales for earnings estimates.  
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quarter. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. For the internal and 
outcome controllable/uncontrollable condition, the participants read the following statements: 
“(t)his is largely attributable to our new marketing strategy, although a well-received marketing 
drive by our main competitor played a minor role. Whether our marketing drive will succeed in 
the future is under/beyond our influence.” In contrast, in the external and outcome 
controllable/uncontrollable condition, the participants read the following statements: “(t)his is 
largely attributable to a well-received marketing drive by our main competitor, although our new 
marketing strategy played a minor role. Whether the future marketing drive by our 
competitor will succeed in the future is under/beyond our influence.”  
Following the management’s statements, participants were asked to provide their perceived 
common stock valuation of the company using a 101-point scale with 0 indicating low and 100 
indicating high (Koonce & Lipe, 2010; Rennekamp, 2012), along with their third-quarter and full 
year earnings estimates.
18
 We also asked participants to indicate their confidence in their 
earnings estimates, willingness to rely on the management’s future disclosure, the persistence of 
negative earnings, the extent that managers can take pro-active steps to improve future earnings, 
the competence and trustworthiness of Theta’s management in their financial disclosures, the 
likelihood that managers are intentionally misguiding the market, and the extent to which the 
management is optimistic or pessimistic about future earnings. Participants responded on 11-
point scales with 0 indicating extremely low and 10 indicating extremely high. On the next page, 
participants were asked to answer some demographic questions. The last section of the 
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 For the third-quarter earnings per share, the management guidance is $0.17 and the consensus analyst forecast is 
$0.20. The ending points for the third-quarter earnings estimates question we provide to participants are $0.07 (10 
cents lower than $0.17) and $0.30 (10 cents higher than $0.20). For the full-year earnings per share, the consensus 
analyst forecast is $0.80, and the ending points for the full-year earnings estimates question we provide to 
participants are $0.40 (40 cents lower than $0.80) and $1.20 (40 cents higher than $0.80). We also confirm that 
quarterly (annual) earnings in prior years fall within this range. 
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experiment contained manipulation check questions, which asked the participants to indicate the 
perceived locus, outcome controllability, plausibility, believability, and verifiability of the 
attribution provided in the management’s disclosure, all using 11-point scales with -5 indicating 
totally internal/outcome uncontrollable/implausible/unbelievable/unverifiable and +5 indicating 
totally external/outcome controllable/plausible/believable/verifiable. 
Manipulation checks for experiment two 
Participants’ ratings on the internal/external nature of the attribution are more internal in the 
internal attribution condition (mean = 0.66) than in the external attribution (mean = 2.07; F = 
15.31, one-tailed p < 0.01). Participants in the outcome controllability condition perceive the 
outcome controllability to be higher (mean = 1.17) than those in the outcome uncontrollable 
condition (mean = -0.96; F = 35.44, one-tailed p < 0.01). In addition, we find that outcome 
controllability has no significant main effect on perceived attribution locus (p = 0.65) and its 
interaction effect with attribution locus is also insignificant (p=0.28). Similarly, attribution locus 
has no significant main effect on perceived outcome controllability of attributions (p = 0.25) and 
its interaction effect with outcome controllability is also insignificant (p=0.28). These results 
imply that participants perceive attribution locus and outcome controllability as distinct and 
independent constructs. Therefore, our manipulations of attribution locus and outcome 
controllability are successful.
 19
 
Results of experiment two 
                                                          
19
 Barton and Mercer (2005) document a positive main effect of plausibility of explanations. Hence, one concern for 
our Experiment Two is that “internal and outcome controllable”/ “external and outcome uncontrollable” attribution 
may be perceived to be more plausible than “internal and outcome uncontrollable”/ “external and outcome 
controllable” attribution. To test this possibility, we asked participants to indicate the perceived plausibility of 
management’s explanation. The alternative explanation above suggests an interaction effect between locus and 
controllability on perceived plausibility, which we fail to find (p = 0.62). We do find a significant main effect of 
controllability (p < 0.01), which is consistent with our argument that investors expect that managers do have control 
over the earnings outcome. The main effect of attribution locus is insignificant (p = 0.20). When we add perceived 
plausibility as a covariate to the contrast test, the coefficient for the covariate is insignificant (p = 0.56).   
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Tests of hypotheses 
H2a states that with negative guidance, investors’ earnings estimates are higher when 
management discloses that an internal attribution is outcome controllable as opposed to 
uncontrollable; H2b predicts that the effect of outcome controllability is weaker for external 
attributions. H2a and H2b jointly indicate an interaction and we conduct a contrast test with the 
weights +3 for the “internal and outcome controllable” condition,” -1 for the “internal and 
outcome uncontrollable,” “external and outcome controllable,” and “external and outcome 
uncontrollable” conditions (Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990). The observed effect of outcome 
controllability and locus on investors’ third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates is consistent 
with our predictions (see Panels B and C, Figure 2). The descriptive statistics, ANOVA and 
contrast tests results for the third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates are presented in Table 
2.
 
For the third-quarter earnings estimates, although the pattern is consistent with our hypotheses, 
the results fail to reach a statistical significance at conventional levels under either ANOVAs or 
contrast tests (as shown in Panels B and C, Table 2).
 20
 For the full-year earnings estimates, the 
two-way interaction is not significant (p = 0.30) under ANOVA; however, the planned contrast is 
significant, which is consistent with our prediction (one-tailed p = 0.03, Panel E, Table 2). 
Consistent with H2a, attribution outcome controllability matters for an internal attribution. For 
an internal attribution, investors’ full-year earnings estimates are higher for the outcome 
controllable attribution (mean = 0.780) than for the outcome uncontrollable attribution (mean = 
0.739; F = 3.48, one-tailed p = 0.03). Consistent with H2b, the effect of outcome controllability 
is insignificant for an external attribution (mean = 0.754/0.745 for outcome 
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 When we exclude those participants whose highest degree is no higher than high school (usable n = 137, 68% of 
the full sample), results from the contrast tests are significant for third-quarter earnings estimates (F = 2.66, one-
tailed p = 0.05) and full-year earnings estimates (F = 7.81, one-tailed p < 0.01). This suggests that more 
sophisticated investors are more sensitive to the effect of locus and outcome controllability on short-term earnings 
judgments than their less sophisticated peers. 
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controllable/uncontrollable conditions respectively; F = 0.16, p = 0.69).
21 
 Additional simple 
effect tests show that the mean full-year earnings estimates in the internal and outcome 
uncontrollable condition (mean = 0.739) are not significantly different from those in the external 
and outcome controllable condition (mean = 0.754, F = 0.50, p = 0.48) or those in the external 
and outcome uncontrollable condition (mean = 0.745, F = 0.09, p = 0.77). In sum, our results 
suggest that a statement about an outcome being "beyond our influence" effectively unwinds any 
positive effect of including an internal attribution in a negative-news forward-looking disclosure. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Test of mechanisms 
As we discussed in hypothesis development, we expect that the joint effect of locus and 
outcome controllability on earnings estimates operates via their impacts on perceived 
management credibility and the perceived favorability of future earnings prospects. We measure 
management credibility by taking the average of perceived management competence and 
trustworthiness (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.84).22 We measure the favorability of future earnings 
prospects by asking the participants to indicate the extent to which the management is optimistic 
or pessimistic about future earnings prospects. All these questions are measured on 11-point 
scales, with 0 indicating not at all incompetent/not at all trustworthy/extremely pessimistic and 
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 We ask participants to indicate the likelihood that the managers can take pro-active steps to improve the firm’s 
future earnings. We find that outcome controllability leads to higher likelihoods of pro-active behavior by the 
managers (one-tailed p = 0.05) and the main effect of locus and the interaction effect are all insignificant (p = 0.35 
and 0.17, respectively). 
22
 We include both management competence and trustworthiness as proxies for management credibility. When 
guidance is negative, higher/lower outcome controllability implies higher/lower managerial ability to change the 
current negative consequences (Karasawa, 1991), which can affect perceptions of management competence. In 
addition, a controllable attribution is in line with outsiders’ expectations and will be perceived as more trustworthy 
(Lee & Tiedens, 2001). 
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11 indicating extremely competent/trustworthy/optimistic. Untabulated results suggest that there 
are marginally significant interaction effects of locus and outcome controllability on 
management credibility (one-tailed equivalent p = 0.10) and the favorability of future earnings 
prospects (one-tailed equivalent p = 0.07). We conduct contrast tests using the same weights as 
the main analysis (+3/-1/-1/-1 in the “internal and controllable”/ “internal and uncontrollable”/ 
“external and controllable”/ “external and uncontrollable” conditions), and the contrasts are 
significant for management credibility (F = 3.69, one-tailed p = 0.03) and for the favorability of 
earnings prospects (F = 10.39, one-tailed p < 0.01).   
As shown in Figure 4, we rely on structural equation modelling to verify the mechanism 
through which attribution locus and outcome controllability jointly work on investors’ judgments 
and decisions. We expect that attribution locus and outcome controllability jointly influence 
perceived management credibility and favorability of earnings prospects, which in turn affect 
investors’ full-year earnings estimates and their common stock valuation judgments. The 
model’s goodness of fit is confirmed with a conventional χ2 test (χ2 = 28.16, df = 22, p = 0.17) 
and RMSEA (=0.04). As indicated in links 1 and 2 of the model, when an attribution is internal, 
outcome controllability has a significantly positive effect on management credibility and 
favorability of future earnings prospects (t = 3.51/3.34, both p < 0.01). In contrast, when the 
attribution is external, the effect of outcome controllability is not significant (t = 1.50/1.30, p = 
0.13/0.20). Both management credibility and favorability of future earnings prospects are 
positively associated with participants’ earnings estimates (link 3/4, t = 2.22/3.22, p = 0.03/0.01), 
which in turn positively affects their common stock valuation judgments (link 5: t = 3.84, p < 
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0.01). In addition, management credibility is also positively associated with participants’ 
willingness to rely on future guidance (link 6: t=10.35, p<0.01).
 23
     
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
Conclusion 
Attributions accompanying management guidance are important because they offer reasons 
as to why forecasted future performance can improve or deteriorate, and influence how investors 
assess the possibility of guided earnings realizations. In our first experiment, we examine the 
joint effects of attribution locus and guidance news valence on investors’ earnings judgments. 
We find that for negative guidance, an external attribution leads to lower earnings estimates by 
investors compared to an internal attribution. We find no effect of attribution locus for positive 
guidance. Experiment One provides the first systematic demonstration of how the effect of 
attribution locus is conditional on the valence of guidance news. In Experiment Two, we extend 
the literature by separating out the effects of attribution outcome controllability from attribution 
locus, and show that the effect of outcome controllability is conditional on attribution locus. We 
show that for internal attributions, investors provide higher earnings estimates when it is 
outcome controllable than when it is outcome uncontrollable. The effect of outcome 
controllability is not evident when an external attribution is provided.  
Our study provides useful information to managers about associated costs and benefits when 
they make disclosure choices. Attributing negative guidance to external factors (‘self-serving’ 
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 We do not include the likelihood that managers are intentionally misguiding the market in the model since, in 
Experiment Two, we held negative news constant so we do not expect intention to misguide to be a strong factor. As 
a robustness test, we calculate a reverse-coded measure of misguidance, which loads onto the same factor as 
perceived competence and trustworthiness (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.74). When we use the average of the three 
variables as a composite credibility measure, SEM results are similar. 
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attribution) may be counter-productive if management’s intention when issuing external 
attributions is to pass the buck. Our results in Experiment One indicate that investors are actually 
more pessimistic about future earnings when an external rather than an internal attribution 
accompanies negative guidance. Our results in Experiment Two suggest that there are benefits to 
firms in terms of a positive impact on investors’ earnings-related judgments when the firms 
provide information about outcome controllability, and this positive impact is stronger for an 
internal attribution. One implication of our experiments is that investors benefit from greater 
management transparency in terms of their explanations that accompany earnings guidance. As 
we show in Experiment Two, investors respond differently to the same internal attribution, 
conditional on whether the outcome is controllable. Thus, information on outcome controllability 
does help investors to differentially interpret the internal attribution. However, management 
likely has incentives not to do so. In Experiment One, we find that investors make inferences 
about outcome controllability when given only information about locus—specifically, they 
assume that internal locus is associated with greater outcome controllability. This is likely an 
inference that management wants investors to make—as we demonstrate in Experiment Two, an 
internal locus/outcome controllable condition leads to the highest investor earnings judgments. 
This also suggests that management may not disclose outcome controllability information 
particularly when it pertains to internal attribution settings and the outcome is uncontrollable—
management likely prefers to merely disclose the attribution locus and leave out the details of the 
outcome uncontrollability aspect. 
Our study provides the first demonstration that dimensions of attributions interact to produce 
effects different from consideration of each dimension alone. One limitation is that we do not 
examine how the dimensions we examine interact with other attribution dimensions such as 
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globality (i.e., whether the attribution affects other companies or the guiding company alone) and 
stability (the extent the attribution is stable across time). The attributions we provide are also less 
verifiable, and we do not vary the verifiability of these attributions. These are fruitful areas for 
future research. In addition, we choose one specific setting (i.e., management guidance) where 
attribution outcome controllability likely matters. Future research may investigate whether our 
conclusions generalize to other settings such as actual earnings announcements (Barton & 
Mercer, 2005; Tan & Lipe, 1997).  
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Panel A: Predicted effects (H1) 
 
Panel B: Observed effects on third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates 
  
 
Fig.1. The joint effect of guidance news and attribution locus on investors’ earnings estimates. Notes: Panel A 
depicts the predicted pattern of the interaction of guidance news and attribution locus on investors’ earnings 
estimates. Panel B depicts the observed pattern for participants’ third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates.  
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Fig.2. Structural equation modelling for Experiment One. Notes: The model shows that attribution locus interacts 
with guidance news in influencing management credibility, which influences their assessments of guidance 
(measured by a reverse-coded measure of perceived likelihood of misguiding). A reversed-coded measure of 
perceived likelihood of misguiding in turn influences investors’ earnings estimates. The Chi-square value is 20.78 
(df = 15, p = 0.14) and RMSEA value is 0.07 (below the cutoff of 0.08), which confirm the model’s goodness of fit.  
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Panel A: Predicted effects (H2) 
 
Panel B: Observed effects on third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates 
 
Fig.3. The joint effect of locus and outcome controllability on investors’ earnings estimates. Notes: Panel A depicts 
the predicted pattern of the interaction of locus and outcome controllability on investors’ earnings estimates. Panel B 
depicts the observed pattern for participants’ third-quarter and full-year earnings estimates. We use the contrast 
weights +3 in the internal and outcome controllable condition, and -1 in internal and outcome uncontrollable, 
external and outcome controllable, and external and outcome uncontrollable conditions to test Hypothesis 2 (see 
Table 2). 
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Fig. 4. Structural equation modelling for Experiment Two. Notes: The model shows that both management 
credibility and favorability of earnings prospects explain the earnings results. The Chi-square value is 28.16 (df = 22, 
p = 0.17) and RMSEA value is 0.04 (below the cutoff of 0.08), which confirm the model’s goodness of fit.  
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Table 1  
Experiment one: Joint effects of news valence and attribution locus on investors’ earnings 
estimates. 
Panel A: Mean earnings estimates (standard deviation) 
a 
 
News Valence 
 Attribution Locus 
 Internal External Control (No) 
Positive 
(Guidance=$0.23) 
Q3eps 0.214 (0.019) 0.220 (0.017) 0.212 (0.017) 
FYeps 0.786 (0.109) 0.818 (0.092) 0.804 (0.021) 
 N=20 N=21 N=21 
Negative 
(Guidance=$0.17) 
Q3eps 0.189 (0.023) 0.172 (0.012) 0.181 (0.017)  
FYeps 0.765 (0.078) 0.733 (0.062) 0.743 (0.079) 
 N=20 N=19 N=18 
 
Panel B: Third-quarter earnings estimates: ANOVA results 
b 
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
News Valence 0.03 1 81.58 <0.01 
Attribution Locus 0.00 1 2.04 0.16 
News Valence × Attribution Locus 0.00 1 7.40 0.01
c
 
Error 0.00 76   
 
Panel C: Third-quarter earnings estimates: Contrasts  
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Contrast: Effect of locus for negative guidance 0.00 1 8.39 0.01
c
 
Contrast: Effect of locus for positive guidance 0.00 1 0.86 0.36 
 
Panel D: Full-year earnings estimates: ANOVA results  
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
News Valence 0.05 1 7.04 0.01 
Attribution Locus 0.00 1 0.00 0.99 
News Valence × Attribution Locus 0.02 1 2.47 0.06
c
 
Error 0.01 72   
 
Panel E: Full-year earnings estimates: Contrasts  
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Contrast: Effect of locus for negative guidance 0.01 1 1.80 0.09
c
 
Contrast: Effect of locus for positive guidance 0.01 1 0.97 0.33 
a Experiment One examines the joint effects of attribution locus and guidance news valence on investors’ reactions 
to the management guidance. We conduct a
 
2×2+2 between-subjects experiment. The first manipulated factor is the 
news valence of the management guidance, whether it is $0.23 for the positive condition or $0.17 for the negative 
condition (the consensus analysts’ forecast is held constant as $0.20 in both conditions). The second manipulated 
factor is the attribution locus, whether it is internal or external attribution accompanying the management guidance. 
b 
The ANOVA results reported do not include the two control conditions where no attribution is provided. We re-
perform the ANOVA by including the two control conditions in the independent variable (i.e., a 3×2 design), and 
the results are qualitatively the same. 
 
c
 indicates that the p-value is one-tailed. 
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Table 2 
Experiment two: Joint effects of attribution locus and outcome controllability on investors’ 
earnings estimates. 
Panel A: Mean earnings estimates (standard deviation) 
a 
Attribution 
Locus 
Attribution Outcome Controllability 
 Controllable Uncontrollable 
Internal 
Q3eps 0.180 (0.027) 0.175 (0.029) 
FYeps 0.780 (0.111) 0.739 (0.118) 
 N=47 N=61 
External 
Q3eps 0.177 (0.026) 0.176 (0.035) 
FYeps 0.754 (0.110) 0.745 (0.106) 
 N=49 N=45 
Panel B: Third-quarter earnings estimates: ANOVA results
 
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Attribution Locus  0.00 1 0.05 0.83 
Outcome Controllability 0.00 1 0.55 0.46 
Locus × Outcome Controllability 0.00 1 0.32 0.57 
Error 0.00 198   
Panel C: Third-quarter earnings estimates: Contrasts 
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Contrast [Hypothesis 2] 0.00 1 0.75 0.39 
Residual 0.00 2 0.09 0.92 
Error 0.00 198   
Contrast: Effect of controllability for internal attribution 0.00 1 1.00 0.32 
Contrast: Effect of controllability for external attribution 0.00 1 0.01 0.91 
Panel D: Full-year earnings estimates: ANOVA results 
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Attribution Locus  0.01 1 0.38 0.54 
Outcome Controllability 0.03 1 2.55 0.11 
Locus × Outcome Controllability 0.01 1 1.07 0.30 
Error 0.01 198   
Panel E: Full-year earnings estimates: Contrasts 
Source Mean Square df F Sig. 
Contrast [Hypothesis 2] 0.04 1 3.38 0.03
b
 
Residual 0.00 2 0.31 0.73 
Error 0.01 198   
Contrast: Effect of controllability for internal attribution 0.05 1 3.48 0.03
b
 
Contrast: Effect of controllability for external attribution 0.00 1 0.16 0.69 
a 
Experiment Two examines the interaction effect of attribution locus and outcome controllability on investors’ 
reactions to negative management guidance. We conduct a 2×2 between-subjects experiment. We hold constant the 
guidance news ($0.17) as negative, compared with the analysts’ consensus forecast ($0.20). The first manipulated 
variable is the attribution locus, whether it is internal or external to the company. The second manipulated factor is 
the outcome controllability of attribution, whether the predicted earnings outcome is controllable or uncontrollable 
by the management.   
b 
indicates that the p-value is one-tailed. 
 
